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I. Introduction
Modern warfare has the potential to inflict enormous damage upon the natural environment.
In the post-Cold-War world few areas have suffered greater environmental harm from wartime military activities than the area in and around Iraq; two of the most extreme examples were inflicted by the former Iraqi government. In the first Gulf War, Iraqi forces set fire to 600 of Kuwait's oil wells, and uncapped or damaged 175 more.
1 During the same conflict at least six million barrels of oil were deliberately discharged into the Persian Gulf, 2 adding to the already considerable damage wrought by routine oil industry operations and the hundreds of attacks on tankers and oil facilities during the Iran-Iraq war. 
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II. The Marsh Arabs
Before the first Gulf War Southern Mesopotamia held southwestern Asia's most extensive wetlands, at the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates. 8 For thousands of years these wetlands, spreading out on all sides of the Tigris, the Euphrates and the Shatt al-Arab, had been occupied by the ancestors of the people known today as the Marsh Arabs, a culture uniquely adapted to the marsh environment. 9 Today the Marsh Arabs, like a majority of Iraqis, are Shia Muslims. In 1991, after the first Gulf War, the Marsh Arabs and other Shiites in southern Iraq rose up in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow or at least throw off the control of the Hussein government. The government responded not only with conventional military force but with an attack on the environment: Over the next few years the government built a system of dams, dikes and canals to drain the wetlands, so that today only 7% of the original area remains. 10 While the exact number of deaths and of persons displaced as a result will probably never be known, most sources give numbers of displaced persons between 200,000 and 400,000. 11 A similar number may remain in the 8 See, e.g., Colin Freeman, Marsh Arabs Reclaim Paradise, THE SCOTSMAN, August 16, 2003 . The frequent references to "Eden" and "Paradise" in discussions of the Marsh Arabs reflect the belief that the Garden of Eden was located in the region. 9 See Freeman, supra note 8; Spoils of War, supra note 1; Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
10 Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
11 See, e.g., Marsh Arabs, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 8. former marshes in a state of extreme poverty.
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Today the Mesopotamian wetlands are parched earth crusted with salt; the reeds are gone, and along with them the smooth-coated otter, the crested porcupine, the grey wolf, the Basrah reed warbler, important staging areas for migrating waterfowl, countless fish and invertebrates, and a crucial food supply for the fish of the Persian Gulf.
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III. The Legality of Iraq's Actions Under International Law
At the time of its campaign against the Marsh Arabs, the government of Iraq was party to a number of international conventions bearing on its conduct. In addition, there existed a relevant body of customary international law. This section will examine which obligations under those treaties or under customary international law were violated by Iraq's conduct. In the final category are several environmental agreements to which Iraq is a party. These agreements deal with peacetime environmental issues, not with warfare, and their applicability to the situation of the Marsh Arabs is limited.
A. Sources of International Law
C. Note on Customary International Law
Before discussing the treaties, it is necessary to take a preliminary look at customary international law. 11-12 (1983) .
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture… 44 An unknown number of Marsh Arabs were killed outright by Iraqi forces during the drainage operations.
45 At this time the "hostilities" were largely over, and most or all of those killed would have been taking no active part. has not yet ratified it, takes the position that much of Protocol I is customary law and thus binding.
For the most part this seems to be borne out in the practice of states.
In the post-World War II world conflicts within states have been far more common than conflicts between states, although the line is often very difficult to draw. The dispute over how to treat internal armed conflicts that had led to the adoption of Common Article 3 in the four 1949
Geneva Conventions arose again in the negotiations leading to the adoption of Protocols I and II.
Many countries proposed that there should be little or no difference in the treatment of internal and international armed conflicts. Norway, for example, successfully urged the adoption of a 55 The United States, incidentally, is a party to ENMOD.
56 ENMOD, supra note 23, art. I(1). In addition, the destruction of the wetlands did have "the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population" and did "leave the civilian population with such inadequate food and water as to cause its starvation or force its movement," as prohibited by
Article 54. 67 The destruction was also carried out as a reprisal, also prohibited: "These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals."
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Article 55 of the Protocol is aimed purely at protection of the environment and of civilian populations dependent upon it:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term, and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended to or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
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In addition, "Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited." 70 This treaty provision was designed to prohibit exactly the type of harm that occurred in southern Iraq: Retaliation against a civilian population by damaging the environment upon which that population depended for its health and survival. 66 Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 63, ¶2086.
67 Protocol I, supra note 24, art 54(2).
68 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(4). 69 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 55(1).
70 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 55(2). (1) and (2) of Protocol I, but somewhat more narrowly worded. Article 14 provides:
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.
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In contrast, Article 54 of Protocol I provides:
73 Protocol II, art. I(1).
74 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. I(4). 75 Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 14.
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 76 2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
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The minor textual difference has significant consequences for the Marsh Arabs.
Protocol I, possibly inapplicable to their situation, places the prohibition of destroying indispensable objects in a separate numbered paragraph from the prohibition of starvation. That separate paragraph elaborates further: It is illegal not merely to destroy these objects to starve the civilian population, but also to destroy them to cause the civilians to move away or for any other reason.
If Protocol I were applicable to the situation, a violation could be proved by showing that the marshes were an indispensable object. While this might be difficult, under Protocol II there is a second hurdle: The motive of the Hussein government must have been to starve the civilian population, rather than to injure them in some other way.
(Note, though, that the exceptions in Articles 54(1) and 54(3) of Protocol I do not apply to Article 14 of Protocol II.)
Even more distressing is the absence in Protocol II of any specifically 76 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(1).
77 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(2).
environmental provision analogous to Article 55 of Protocol I. There is, however, a prohibition on the forced movement of civilians in Article 17 of Protocol II:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict. However, Iraq is not a party to Protocol I or II, and even if the provisions of the Protocols have, as the U.S. maintains, entered into customary law, Iraq has in all probability been a consistent dissenter, preventing the formation of any normative expectation that Iraq will act in accordance with the Protocols or feels obligated to do so.
While countries such as Norway may feel that a single standard should apply to all armed conflicts, a cynic might observe that the probability that Norway will suffer an internal armed conflict at any time in the foreseeable future is remote. 79 See, e.g., HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 195 (1990) : "It might, in the light of the very large number of states party to them, be argued that the whole of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although not of the 1977 Additional Protocols, have been absorbed into the body of jus cogens." McCoubrey's approach to jus cogens may be somewhat more skeptical than that of many scholars, although a similar or greater skepticism is expressed by many governments. The debate over the existence, nature and extent of jus cogens norms is extensive, and beyond the scope of this paper. anticipated.
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Iraq's attack on the southern Mesopotamian wetlands was launched not only with the knowledge but also with the intention that it would cause "widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment." (Note that the standard is identical to that in Articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I.) 82 It certainly seems excessive in relation to any military advantage obtained. Iraq, however, is not a party to the Rome Statute.
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F. Environmental Treaties to which Iraq Is a Party
In addition to the treaties discussed above dealing specifically with wartime environmental damage, none of which Iraq is a party to, Iraq is also a party to 50 treaties with environmental provisions. 84 Of these, there are a few that merit at least cursory examination in a discussion of the eutrophication. The removal of the filtering capacity of the wetlands will also lead to an increase in the quantity of pollutants from other sources ultimately reaching the gulf.
While the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol may provide some recourse for Iraq's neighbors injured by increased marine pollution, they provide none for the Marsh Arabs. The suffering of the Marsh Arabs is the result of the destruction of the marshes, not the result of any consequent pollution of the marine environment.
G. The Human Rights Covenants
The 
H. Customary International Law
In addition to the treaties mentioned above to which Iraq is not a party but which may have entered into customary international law, there are some general principles of customary international law that may be applicable to the destruction of the southern Mesopotamian wetlands.
July 13, 2004
Envtl. Damage in Yugoslavia
33
Most such law deals entirely with relations between states, however. It might thus provide a remedy to Iran for damage to its portion of the wetlands, but none to the Iraqi Marsh Arabs.
Customary law might, however, provide guidance in defining terms such as "military necessity" and "widespread, long-term and severe."
The Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention incorporates customary international law to fill any lacunae in the treaty regime governing state conduct during wartime:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued. . . the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
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Thus treaties may derogate from customary international law, but in the absence of such provisions the rules of customary international law are binding on the parties to the Hague Convention. Note also that the Convention itself has attained, through widespread observance or at least aspiration, 
IV. Conclusion
The various environmental treaties to which Iraq is a party and customary international law regarding transboundary environmental harm provide little recourse for the Marsh Arabs, although they may provide the basis for claims to be pursued by neighboring states. Conversely, however, the former Iraqi government is not likely to be exonerated on grounds of military necessity.
Of the treaties to which Iraq is a party, the Genocide Convention most clearly prohibits acts Treaties to which Iraq is not a party address the specific problem of environmental modification used in war or as an instrument of persecution of an ethnic group. ENMOD and the Rome Statute prohibit environmental warfare of the type engaged in by Iraq, but it is unlikely that the provisions of either have been accepted as custom in the practice of states.
Protocols I and II, however, are probably expressions of customary international law, and may even express jus cogens or non-derogable norms. Of these, Protocol I addresses environmental harm far more directly. Under Protocol I, the Iraqi government's action against the southern Mesopotamian wetlands was illegal because its effects were widespread, long-lasting, and severe, and because it was a prohibited reprisal against the natural environment. Under Protocol II, on the other hand, the action was only illegal if the wetlands were an "object" within the meaning of the convention, and also if the purpose of destroying the wetlands was to starve the Marsh Arabs, as opposed to causing them to leave or harming them in some other way. 
38
The Marsh Arabs will be eligible for the greater protection of Protocol I if they were engaged in a struggle against a racist regime. While the Hussein government was not a racist regime in the traditional sense, the rift between the ruling minority and the Marsh Arabs may have been sufficient to bring the regime within the scope of the Protocol.
Even the smallest degree of military advantage during combat may be worth an enormous amount of post-war disapproval. In addition, rebel soldiers are not likely to restrain their actions for military reasons; if they fail to achieve their military objectives and are defeated by the state against which they are fighting, they can expect to be imprisoned or executed in any event. A trial for environmental war crimes is a remote concern. The lack of any effective constraint on the rebel side may lead to a lack of restraint on the government side.
Balanced against this is self-interest: The territory the government is harming in a noninternational conflict is, ultimately, its own territory. In addition to international disapproval, the offending government will bear the costs of the damage.
For the Marsh Arabs themselves, the future is uncertain. Restoration projects are being discussed, but such projects will require a great deal of money that is not likely to be forthcoming while the political situation in Iraq remains unstable. Even if restoration is funded, it is unlikely that the marshes can be fully returned to their original condition. And by that time many of the Marsh Arabs may have drifted away, or perished, although some will doubtless return. 128 In the meantime, the best way to prevent others from suffering a similar fate is to hold those responsible accountable under international law.
